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Abstract
Innovation processes toward sustainable development (eco-innovations) have received increasing
attention during the past years. Since existing theoretical and methodological frameworks do not
address these problems adequately, research need can be identified to improve our understanding of
innovation processes toward sustainability in their different dimensions, complex feedback
mechanisms and interrelations. This paper discusses the potential contribution of neoclassical and
(co-)evolutionary approaches from environmental and innovation economics to fill this gap. It is
argued that both approaches have their merits and limits concerning a theory and policy of eco-
innovation. Neoclassical methods are most elaborated to analyze the efficiency of incentive systems
which seems to be essential for stimulating innovation. Evolutionary approaches are more
appropriate for analyzing long-term technological regime shifts. On this theoretical basis, a crucial
question is if innovations toward sustainability can be treated like normal innovations or if a
specific theory and policy are needed. Three specialties of eco-innovation are identified: the double
externality problem, the regulatory push/pull effect and the increasing importance of social and
institutional innovation. While the first two of them are widely ignored in innovation economics,
the third is at least not elaborated appropriately. The consideration of these specialties may help to
overcome market failure by establishing a specific eco-innovation policy and to avoid a "technology
bias" by a broader understanding of innovation. Eco-innovation policy requires close coordination
with environmental policy in all innovation phases. Environmental and eco-innovation policy can be
regarded as complementarily. However, an environmental policy neglecting the potentially
beneficial effects of a specific eco-innovation policy (especially in the invention phase) may lead to
excessive economic costs. Due to the specialties of eco-innovation, it seems moreover to be crucial
to strengthen the importance of social and institutional innovation in both eco-innovation theory and
policy.
Keywords: eco-innovation; innovation theory; co-evolution; double externality; regulatory push/pull
effect; social innovation; institutional innovation1 Introduction
Since the world community committed itself in 1992 in Rio to the principles of sustainable
development, it has become more and more clear that sustainability means long-term and far-
reaching changes of technologies, infrastructure, life-styles and institutions.
Thus the importance of a better understanding of innovation processes has several reasons:
•   The demand for drastic reductions of environmental burdens, e.g., of greenhouse gases, implies
that adaptation within existing technologies is not sufficient. Instead, regulation strategies to
effect "technology forcing" and/or "technological regime shifts" are needed.
•   Secondly, innovation is expected to offset burdens and costs induced by environmental
regulations. Secondary benefits of an innovation-friendly environmental policy are often seen in
reduced costs, increased competitiveness, creation of new markets for environmentally desirable
products and processes, corresponding employment effects etc. Although these aspects have
already been emphasized by Porter and van der Linde (1995a), the Porter-hypothesis postulating
"innovation offsets" of strict environmental policy is not embedded in economic theory and
received with scepticism among mainstream economists (Jaffe and Palmer, 1996; Ulph, 1996).
•   New types of vehicles, renewable energy systems or corresponding infrastructure often need at
least a decade or more for invention, for adaptation and for diffusion respectively. In total, it is
realistic to assume time-scales of half a century and more for major changes in important
economic and social sub-systems, like technological regime shifts in energy and transport
systems. Thus, in situations far away from the desired equilibrium, the importance of analyzing
transition and learning processes moves into the foreground.
•   Moreover, many scenarios suppose that long-term sustainability goals can not be met by
progress in environmental technology and must be supplemented by corresponding life styles,
e.g. through energy saving or changing mobility patterns, and institutional changes (ranging
from local networks to global organizations).
•   Inventing or adapting environmentally desirable processes or products is already part of every
day life for a large majority of firms and thus a field of scientific research. As Cleff and
Rennings (1998) have shown in a German industry survey, about 80 percent of all innovating
firms have been involved in environmental-friendly innovation projects during the past three
years. It is hard to find even a small or medium sized enterprise that has no experience at all
with substituting hazardous substances, designing and using eco-efficient products, saving
energy, waste and material or reducing emissions. Managing eco-innovation is an increasingly
important issue for many firms.
•   Finally, innumerable sustainability programs and initiatives have been set up to promote
innovative policy responses and corresponding scientific research to improve the understanding
of global environmental change and it’s relation to economic and social systems. Having this in
mind, together with long time-scales, a careful valuation of experiences seems to be crucial to
identify key determinants and success factors of innovation processes toward sustainability, i.e.
to analyze which experiments succeeded, which failed, why they failed, and in which phase.
  Since existing theoretical and methodological frameworks do not address these problems
adequately, research need can be identified to improve our understanding of innovation processes
toward sustainability in their different dimensions, complex feedback mechanisms and
interrelations. Such a framework should be able to give some guidelines about how to analyze these
processes in their different characteristics and phases, to identify promising examples as well as bad
ones, and to give some idea about their transferability to other contexts.
  This paper intends to discuss the potential contribution of neoclassical and (co-)evolutionary
approaches from environmental and innovation economics to fill this gap. A crucial question iswhether innovations toward sustainability can be treated as normal innovations or if a specific
theory and policy are needed. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines basic terms in the
sustainability-innovation-nexus. Sections 3 and 4 describe main economic approaches to analyzing
innovation processes and environmental policy, i.e., neoclassical and evolutionary concepts in
environmental and innovation economics. Finally, conclusions concerning elements of an economic
theory and policy of eco-innovation will be drawn.
 2 Defining innovations toward sustainability
 2.1 Sustainable development
  There is an ongoing debate whether sustainable development can be defined operationally. Some
agree (overview in Rennings and Wiggering, 1997), others doubt or deny that it can (Norgaard,
1994; Cary, 1998a; Minsch 1998). Those who doubt or deny understand sustainability more as an
heuristic idea, similar to ideas of liberty and justice, guiding and orienting our search rather than
predicting its outcome
1.
  However, with any of these interpretations of sustainable development at a certain point it is
necessary to give a more concrete idea about the direction and problem areas of sustainability. In its
environmental report 1998, the German Council of Environmental Advisers identified a consensus
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  Obviously these problem areas require progress toward certain sustainability targets, which may be
different across regions, time-scales, target groups etc. The definition of problem areas and the
negotiation of targets can be analyzed and evaluated by scientists, but decisions are made in the
political process and should be close to peoples’ preferences (Rennings et al., 1998). Some may
postulate a "revolution in eco-efficiency” increasing it by the factor 4 (von Weizsaecker et al., 1995)
or even factor 10 (Schmidt-Bleek, 1994). Ambitious goals as formulated in the Toronto Resolution
for greenhouse gases may be watered down in the political process and lead to modest agreements
like those in the Kyoto Protocol. However, in our context only two features of a definition of
sustainable development are relevant: that it contains an ecological, economic and social dimension
and that even modest sustainability targets, as fixed in the Kyoto Protocol, require substantial
innovation.
                                                          
 
1 As Cary (1998a, p.12) writes: “Sustainability is not a fixed ideal, but an evolutionary process of improving the
management of systems, through improved understanding and knowledge. Analogous to Darwin’s species evolution, the
process is non-deterministic with the end point not known in advance.”
 
2 Six were from Germany (one NGO-report, three from the German environmental protection agency, one from the
government and one from a parliamentary commission) and one from the European Commission. However, the problem
areas may be different in other contexts and countries. For example, agriculture, forestry and households may be added.
Several authors consider population policy as a further central element of a policy of sustainability (Pestel/Radermacher,
1996; Mohr, 1996). But compared with environmental problems this issue is still not well addressed in most
sustainability concepts and strategies. 2.2 Innovation
  In political and scientific discussions the term “innovation” is interpreted in many different ways. A
narrow definition defines innovations as technological novelties. Used in a broader sense, inno-
vations include the first-time application of newly acquired know-how, new methods, or new prod-
ucts. The term can also be expanded to include non-technological innovation, such as changes in
firm organization or the design of a product.
   In this paper innovation will be understood broadly as a change in the information set that connects
inputs and outputs (Stoneman, 1983; Tirole, 1989; OECD, 1992; Hemmelskamp, 1997). Thus
process, product and organizational innovations are considered and distinguished as follows:
•   Process innovations occur when a given amount of output (goods, services) can be produced
with less input.
•   Product innovations require improvements to existing goods (or services) or the development of
new goods. Product innovations in machinery in one firm are often process innovations in
another firm.
•   Organizational innovations include, e.g., new forms of management like total quality
management.
  Innovation is different from invention, which is an idea or a model for a new improved product or
process. In an economic sense, an invention becomes an innovation when the improved product or
process is first introduced to the market. The third phase is the diffusion phase, when the innovation
is used and adopted over time.
 
 2.3 Innovation toward sustainable development
  2.3.1 Eco-innovation
  The general definition of innovation is neutral concerning the content of change and open in all
directions. In contrast, putting emphasis on innovation toward sustainable development is motivated
by concern about direction and content of  progress. Thus the additional attribute of innovations
toward sustainability is that they reduce environmental burdens at least in one item and thus
contribute to improving the situation in the problem areas mentioned above. Due to unsolved
problems of weighting environmental impacts, a technology reducing air emissions and increasing
solid waste should be regarded as innovation toward sustainability, too, until it is clearly discovered
as an inferior one.
  The interdisciplinary project "Innovation Impacts of Environmental Policy Instruments" (German
acronym: FIU)
3 has introduced the term environmental innovation (short: eco-innovation) and
defined it very broadly as follows (FIU, 1998):
  "Eco-innovations are all measures of relevant actors (firms, politicians, unions, associations,
churches, private households) which:
•   develop new ideas, behavior, products and processes, apply or introduce them and
•   which contribute to a reduction of environmental burdens or to ecologically specified
sustainability targets."
                                                          
 
3 The project involved 10 institutes and 11 sub-projects including mainly case studies which were supplemented by
model comparisons and a representative German industry survey using the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP). FIU was
commissioned by the German Ministry of Research and Technology (BMBF) and running from 1996 to 1998.  Eco-innovations can be developed by firms or non-profit organizations, they can be traded on
markets or not, their nature can be technological, organizational, social or institutional. The
following sections will look more specifically at these distinctions.
  2.3.2 Technological and organizational eco-innovation
  Technological eco-innovations can be distinguished in curative and preventive technologies.
Curative technologies repair damages (e.g. contaminated soils) while preventive technologies try to
avoid them. Preventive technologies include integrated and additive technologies (see Figure 1).
Additive or end-of-pipe technologies include measures like disposal methods and recycling
technologies occurring after the actual production and consumption process. Unlike end-of-pipe
solutions, integrated or cleaner technologies directly address the cause of emissions during the
production process or at the product level. They comprise all measures leading to a reduction in
input materials, energy inputs and emissions during production and consumption. Examples include
reducing or replacing environmentally harmful inputs by environmentally friendly inputs (e.g.
solvent-free lacquers) and changes to the design of products so that they produce fewer emissions
during their use and disposal. Integrated or cleaner technologies are often seen as the main
technological challenge paving the road to sustainable development and are therefore preferred to
additive or end-of-pipe-solutions (UBA,1997; BMBF, 1997).
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  Organizational changes are, for example, management instruments at the firm level like eco-audits
which are obviously of increasing importance for innovation (Bullinger, Rey and Steinaecker,
1997). Eco-innovations in the service sector become more and more relevant when material
products are substituted by less-material intensive services (e.g. demand side management in energy
and transport, waste management). Thus, reductions in mobility, energy and material flows can to a
certain degree be achieved through new services. This requires new infrastructure and system
changes going beyond mere changes of a certain technology (Loske, 1997).
  2.3.3 Social eco-innovation
  Changes of life-styles and consumer behavior are often defined as social innovations  (Scherhorn et
al., 1997, p. 16). With regard to eco-innovation, the term sustainable consumption patterns as
mentioned in the Rio Convention has received increasing attention.
  Any successful innovation, if it is technological, organizational or institutional in its nature, has to
mesh with peoples’ values and life styles. Television, cars and computers make lives more
convenient and comfortable. Nevertheless firms spend large budgets for advertising campaigns to
sell these products and to influence people’s preferences.
  It can be assumed that even greater advertising efforts will be needed for promoting sustainable life
styles. Behavioral changes are a prerequisite for switching transport modes towards an increased use
of trams, railways, buses or bicycles. These social innovations may go along with better
technologies, services and infrastructure. Awareness for tuna caught in a dolphin-friendly way and
for tropical timber or bananas planted in a sustainable manner may require less behavioral change
than information, a certain willingness to pay and perhaps new institutions and instruments (e.g.
labels).  In these cases it may be crucial to identify the main obstacles in the diffusion process of already
existing processes and products: institutional barriers, lack of infrastructure, professional marketing,
knowledge, quality and comfort or distribution systems may lead to unfavorable cost-benefit-ratios.
  2.3.4 Institutional eco-innovation
  Progress is often understood simply as innovation in firms, with a strong focus on technological
progress. Since many problems of sustainable use of nature and land are not primarily technological
questions, this may lead to a “technology bias”. Even more, Norgaard (1994, p. 16) identifies
unsustainable development itself as a result “from technology outpacing changes in social
organization” and postulates that, within a co-evolutionary paradigm of a sustainable management
of economic and ecological systems, “incentives and regulations must evolve with technologies”.
  Natural resources can often be characterized as open access regimes, and unsustainable use stems
from inappropriate institutional arrangements. Innovative institutional responses to problems of
sustainability may range from local networks and agencies (e.g. for water resources of local
relevance) to new regimes of global governance (e.g. an institution responsible for global climate
and biodiversity issues) and international trade (Rennings et al., 1998; SRU, 1998, pp. 318-334).
Innovative institutions include improved decision making through new ways of scientific
assessment and public participation. An example of an innovative scientific network on the global
level is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), numerous other institutions for
public discourse upon environmental and technology impact assessment have been established at
the national, regional and local level.
  Thus, institutional eco-innovations are often seen as a basic foundation for a policy of sustainability
(Freeman, 1992; Minsch, 1997). According to Freeman (1992, p. 191), these institutional
arrangements should be accompanied by a reorientation of the world R&D system “so that these
environmental objectives were given a high priority in the work of industrial, university and
government laboratories. This reorientation would be needed to assure the rate and direction of
technical change necessary to achieve the first objective (sustainable development).”
  The distinctions between the different kinds of innovations can not be very sharp. Collective actions
of households concerning sustainable consumption patterns may be regarded as institutional
innovations, and the creation of environmental awareness in firms as social innovation. Different
kinds of innovation go hand in hand, or, using the terminology of Norgaard, they co-evolve.  Or, as
Freeman (1992, p. 124) writes: “Successful action depends on a combination of advances in
scientific understanding, appropriate political programs, social reforms and other institutional
changes, as well as on the scale and direction of new investment. Organizational and social
innovations would always have to accompany any technical innovations and some would have to
come first.” 3 Eco-innovation in neoclassical economics
 3.1 Environmental and resource economics
  3.1.1 Superiority of market-based instruments
  If  markets were perfect, there would be no need for innovation policy. Prices would give the right
signals to firms for optimal investment in R&D and new technologies. Consumer would adapt their
behavior to their preferences; transaction costs and surprises could be neglected, and the individuals
would optimize social welfare automatically by maximizing their own wellbeing.
  However, when market failure occurs, the signals of the invisible hand may be misleading for
innovation decisions. If prices do not fully reflect peoples’ preferences for certain goods or services,
investment will be too low. Market failure can appear as external effect, non-separability,
information deficiency and inflexibility. In these cases, the government has to correct market
failures. Furthermore, issues of intra- and intergenerational equity are not addressed by markets.
Thus a fair initial distribution of property rights is necessary before these rights can be allocated
efficiently on markets (Rennings et al., 1998).
  From a liberal perspective market-based solutions are preferred to correct market failure as they
minimize distortions to the market system (Ewers and Hassel, 1996). Market-based instruments like
taxes and tradable permits have also been identified in environmental economics as the
environmental policy instruments with the highest dynamic efficiency (innovation efficiency). Their
advantage is that they give permanent incentives for further, cost-efficient emissions reductions. By
contrast, regulatory regimes driven by technical standards (either in a command-and-control system
or in a regime of voluntary agreements in which standards are negotiated between government and
industry) are not cost-efficient and the incentives for progress in emission reduction vanish after the
standards are met.
  The superiority of market-based instruments has been the basic lesson from environmental
economics concerning innovation. However, several exceptions and modifications to the rule have
been made recently:
•   The innovation efficiency of standards can be improved substantially by "technology forcing" in
a command-and-control regime (rules of permanent reductions or long-term standards going
beyond existing technologies) and by repeated negotiations in a regime of voluntary agreements
(continued process of negotiations after each monitoring phase) (Hohmeyer and Koschel, 1995;
Brockmann, 1998).
•   The innovation efficiency of taxes may be watered down in the political process. Total
environmental costs for industry are normally higher under a tax regime than under alternative
regimes of command-and-control or negotiated agreements (because firms have to pay for
residual emissions and pollution). This may lead to a tendency to impose relatively low taxes
with low innovation impacts. It is important to note that it is exactly the innovation-friendly
attribute of taxes (charging firms for residual emissions) which may lead to this counter-effect
(low tax level with low impacts) (Kemp 1997, p. 64).
•   Considering these facts, Kemp (1997, p. 64) summarizes that a regime of free tradable emission
permits is preferable with regard to innovation efficiency: "This is because a tradable permit
system combines the advantage of a tax system with that of a command-and-control regime:
Environmental improvements are achieved at the lowest costs and there is no uncertainty aboutthe total level of emission reduction." Although Kemp’s model includes technological
uncertainty and a risk-averse regulatory agency, not all aspects relevant for innovation are
considered. Examples are the behavior of interest groups in the political process, transaction
costs and distributive consequences. Conclusions may however react sensitively to the
introduction of these aspects, e.g. to the consideration of transaction costs in emissions trading
systems.
•   Further modifications have been derived in general equilibrium models of endogenous growth
and in game theoretic models. While the superiority of market-based  instruments has been
confirmed for situations with perfect competition and full information, the situation may change
under imperfect competition. When firms gain “strategic advantages” from innovation,
standards may be more appropriate for stimulating innovation (Koschel, 1998).
  3.1.2 Perspectives
  Aspects that receive little attention in neoclassical studies analyzing the innovation impacts of
environmental policy are (Hemmelskamp, 1997; Kemp 1997, pp. 39 - 49):
•   The fact that innovations are in most cases not developed by the polluting firm but by
specialized firms in the eco-industry. Innovators and polluters may have different incentives and
interests. The eco-industry wants to maximize profits and turnover and may be interested in
stricter regulation, while the polluting firm wants to reduce avoidance costs and tends to oppose
stricter regulation.
•   Most studies only analyze market failures due to external costs, only few consider information
deficiency and inflexibility. Imperfect knowledge about technological options, surprises and
high transaction costs are normally ignored in neoclassical approaches. Ignoring X-
inefficiencies, it is for many economists hard to understand that "innovation offsets" of a strict
environmental policy - as postulated in the Porter-hypothesis - can occur.
•   Problems of implementation and design of pollution control instruments, e.g., stringency,
flexibility, differentiation, phasing, enforcement and sanctions, are often  ignored.
•   Moreover, neoclassical approaches follow a simple, mechanistic stimulus-response model of
regulation and neglect the complexity of determinants influencing innovation decision in firms.
These determinants will be introduced in the following section of this paper.
  Having identified severe drawbacks of neoclassical models of pollution control concerning their
relevance for decision-making, it is important to mention some oft their merits. Neoclassical
approaches are open to all kinds of eco-innovations, if they are technological, organizational, social
or institutional in nature. Due to the norm of consumer-sovereignty, environmental economists do
not intend to change peoples' preferences but try to measure them. For a correct measurement of
"sustainable preferences", special attention has to be paid to measuring the very long-term utilities
of natural goods and services (Chichilnisky, 1998).
4 When supply with environmental services is
lower than peoples' revealed demand, institutional and social barriers can be identified to overcome
them. For this purposes, institutional approaches have been developed, analyzing the appropriate
institutional setting for specific attributes of economic transactions, or the interaction of utility-
maximizing groups. Relevant approaches are game theory, theory of public goods, public choice
and transaction cost theory. For example, Cary (1998b) has applied transaction cost theory to land
management problems in Australia. Due to the attributes of the transaction - low knowledge of the
transformation process, low separability of inputs and outputs - he identified relational contracts and
cooperation as the most appropriate organizational form. On this theoretical basis he appreciates
                                                          
 
4 An overview of suggestions for considering issues of intra- and intergenerational equity in the measurement of peoples’
willingness to pay (equity weighting and adjustment of discount rates) is given in Rennings and Hohmeyer (1998).recent institutional innovations in Australia towards a more cooperative way of land management.
In such a framework, social and institutional eco-innovation can be analyzed from a neoclassical
perspective
5.
 3.2 Innovation economics
  3.2.1 Specialty of eco-innovation I: double externality
  While the necessity of environmental policy is not doubted in environmental economics, the
necessity of a specific policy (and a corresponding theory) of eco-innovation has to be justified.
Against this background, this section puts some emphasis on identifying the specialty of eco-
innovation making it different from other innovations.
  To start with, eco-innovations differ from normal innovations because they produce a double
externality. External benefits (spill-over effects) are quite normal for basic R&D efforts for every
kind of innovation. The special character of eco-innovation processes is that they develop products
and services which themselves cause external benefits (or: a smaller amount of external costs
compared to competing goods and services on the market). In a perfect neoclassical world where all
external costs are internalized, the double externality problem would vanish and eco-innovations
could be handled like normal ones. Thus, neoclassical economists may only see a necessity for a
specific eco-innovation policy, if at all, in a transition phase until a full internalization of external
costs is achieved.
  But the situation may change when imperfect knowledge, inflexibility, institutional aspects and
transaction costs are considered. When innovation policy can cut the costs of environmental
protection substantially and thus reduce the overall externalities, this may be more cost-efficient
compared to a pure internalization strategy with unknown environmental efficiency (due to
obstacles and a watering down of market-based policy instruments in the political process) and
uncertain economic consequences (uncertainty of a double dividend
6).
  An example: In Germany many environmentalists (including environmental economists) postulate
that fuel prices should rise up to the dimension of 5 Deutschmarks per liter of fuel (around 10 $ per
gallon) to internalize external costs and to reach national targets in climate policy. It is argued that
this will accelerate the development, market-introduction and diffusion of eco-efficient cars. While
this may be true for the innovation and diffusion phase, the preferability of pricing measures on
invention is quite uncertain. And a corresponding price shock comparable to the oil crisis may lead
to undesired economic side-effects. In this situation, design and speed of the process of change
become increasingly important. Giving people and industry time for adjustment to new technologies
considering the life cycle of the existing capital stock may cut the costs of a policy of sustainability
substantially. Thus a strategy seems to be preferable which:
•   is oriented on long term environmental targets,
•   does not determine final prices and
•   increases prices continuously in small steps until the environmental goal is reached.
  An example are the British fuel duties which increase annually by 6 per cent unlimited in time (HM
Customs and Excise CE3, 1997). Simultaneously, experiments and learning processes in smaller
                                                          
 
5 As Cary (1998a, p. 8) writes: „It is likely that the development of a culture of environmental concern and consequent
trusting cooperative action will reduce the high ‘transactional‘ costs associated with many land management problems.“
 
6 For an overview of the discussion about a double dividend in climate protection see Conrad and Schmidt (1998).scales may increase the number of policy options and  lead to decreasing costs. Innovation policy
can stimulate especially the process of invention, reduce undesired economic side-effects and
increase the diversity of options, e.g. by supporting the development of eco-efficient cars or pilot
projects of coordinated regional and local action improving sustainable mobility. Although learning
processes induced by such projects may be slow and more long-term oriented, they can help to save
costs on larger scales.
  Thus environmental policy and eco-innovation policy can be seen mainly complementarily.
Innovation policy can help to cut the costs of technological, institutional and social innovation
especially in the phases of invention and market introduction, e.g. by financial support for pilot
projects. And in the diffusion phase it may help to improve the performance characteristics of eco-
innovations. At least in the diffusion phase, however, coordinated action between environmental
and innovation policy seems to be necessary to achieve significant ecological impacts.
  Thus, for theoretical and practical reasons, the double externality problem can and should not be
solved by environmental policy alone. Nor can it be solved solely by private firms whose R&D
investments in eco-innovation can be assumed to be sub-optimal as long as external costs are only
partially internalized. In a real world, it is hard to imagine a perfect regulatory framework
internalizing all external costs. And even if such a framework would exist, eco-innovation policy
would be beneficial due to time lags of the internalization process.
 
  3.2.2 Specialty of eco-innovation II: regulatory push/pull effect
  Since both externalities result in a sub-optimal investment in eco-innovations, the double externality
problem induces a second specialty: the importance of the regulatory framework as a key
determinant for eco-innovative behavior in firms, households and other institutions. The main
discussion in innovation economics has been whether technological innovation has been driven by
technological development (technology push) or by demand factors (market pull). Empirical
evidence has shown that both are relevant (Pavitt 1984). With regard to eco-innovation, new eco-
efficient technologies can be subsumed under technology push factors, while preferences for
environmentally friendly products or image can be subsumed under market pull factors. Due to the
externality problem of eco-innovations, the traditional discussion of innovation economists has to
be extended to the influence of the regulatory framework (regulatory push/pull). Figure 2 illustrates
the determinants of eco-innovation. As empirical evidence shows (Green et al., 1994;  Porter and
van der Linde, 1995a, 1995b; Kemp, 1997; Hemmelskamp, 1997; Cleff and Rennings, 1998), the
regulatory framework and especially environmental policy have a strong impact on eco-innovation.
Eco-innovations are, in contrast to such technologies as microelectronics and telecommunications,
normally not self-enforcing. Since factors of technology push and market pull alone do not seem to
be strong enough, eco-innovations need specific regulatory support.
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  Cleff and Rennings (1998) have analyzed determinants of technological/organizational  eco-
innovative behavior at the firm level considering explicitly different categories of end-of-pipe and
cleaner technologies. Empirically the study is based on data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel
(MIP)
7 1996, which had introduced some questions to identify eco-innovators. In an additional
telephone survey with these eco-innovative firms, some more specific information has been
                                                          
 
7 The MIP is part of the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
 gathered. The multivariate analysis shows that within their innovation goals eco-innovative firms
attach significantly higher importance to cost reduction and total quality management (TQM) than
other innovators. Obviously eco-efficiency is understood as a part of total efficiency. With regard to
integrated technologies, differences between ecological product- and process-innovations are
identified. Environmental product innovation is significantly driven by the strategic market behavior
of firms (market pull effect), while environmental process-innovation is more driven by regulation
(regulatory push/pull effect). More specifically, significant regulatory push/pull effects impacts have
mainly been measured for “soft” instruments like negotiated agreements, eco-audits and
environmental liability law. This result can be explained by:
•   the dominance of “soft” respectively missing “hard” instruments in Germany in recent years,
•   the absence of market based instruments and the
•   experience that effects of direct regulation (command-and-control) may be not significant
because they do not discriminate between eco-innovative and non eco-innovative firms.
3.2.3 Perspectives
Using industry micro-data either for technological or organizational innovations, such studies may
improve our understanding of short-term, incremental changes in firms. They should be
supplemented by additional surveys on eco-innovation in the service sector. With regard to
strategies of de-materialization or de-carbonization of consumption and production patterns within a
policy of sustainability, innovation in the service sector plays a key role. Since large parts of green
production belong to the service sector (e.g. changes in waste treatment, transport and technical
consulting), there is a strong need for empirical research in the relevant branches. Surveys should be
supplemented by case-studies analyzing the success and failure of interrelated technological, social
and institutional eco-innovation.
For long-term innovation processes including more radical changes, however, neoclassical models
assuming marginal changes and equilibrium situations may be too narrow. Broader evolutionary
approaches have been developed to improve our understanding of radical system changes. Their
contribution to a theory and policy of eco-innovation will be discussed in the next section.
4 Eco-innovation in (co-)evolutionary approaches
4.1 Variation, selection and co-evolution
While deterministic neoclassical models have their merits especially for analyzing marginal or
incremental changes induced by different kinds of incentives, they are of limited value for the
analysis of more radical changes of technological systems including the organizational and societal
context. According to Freeman (1992, pp. 77-81), incremental innovations can be characterized as
continuous improvements of existing technological systems (i.e. they fit in existing input-output
tables) while radical innovations are discontinuous (i.e. they require new lines and columns in input-
output-tables).
Evolutionary approaches have therefore been developed to open up the "black box" of surprises
being connected with radical changes: unpredictable interactions of sub-systems, irreversibility,
path-dependency, lock-in effects of technological trajectories or bifurcation. Evolutionary
approaches are more interested in the analysis of transition and learning processes than inequilibrium states, and assume bounded rationality and rules of thumb rather than optimization.
Main methods are case studies and ex post analysis since predictions regarding which option will
succeed are recognized as being impossible.
The biological terms of selection and variation are used to describe the innovation process.
Inventions are variations which succeed or fail in the evolutionary process due to selection criteria
of their environment. According to Freeman (1992, pp. 123 - 127), the selection environment of the
innovation process can be divided into  three categories:
•   Natural environment. Man-made environmental problems or external forces may put selective
pressure on society to create new technologies, e.g., phasing out CFCs to protect the ozone layer
or forcing energy saving technologies to mitigate climate change.
•   Built environment. The built environment consists of physical assets, i.e. the existing
infrastructure. The built environment needs decades to be depreciated, thus slowing down
innovation and diffusion processes.
•   Institutional environment. Profitability can be identified as a key selection criterion in market
economies.
  It should be noted that the variation-selection-terminology focuses only on technological
innovations and does not explicitly consider complex feedback mechanisms between variations and
the selection environment. This seems to be inadequate having in mind that an innovation is not
only selected by the environment but also changes the environment by selective pressures. CFCs
have depleted the ozone layer and led to the invention of CFC-substitutes, changes of institutions
and consumer behavior. These responses (such as "soft" CFCs) put again selective pressures on the
environment raising concern for improved eco-innovations. Similar feedback-mechanisms can be
observed in energy policy where eco-innovations such as cleaner fossils, safer nuclear, rational use
of energy and renewables are responses to environmental pressures (scarcity of fossil fuels, air
pollution, greenhouse effect, nuclear risks) but also change the environment by selective pressures.
  In ecological economics, these complex feedback mechanisms have been addressed by the co-
evolutionary paradigm as defined by Norgaard (1984, p. 161): “In biology, coevolution refers to an
evolutionary process based on reciprocal responses between two interacting species. … The concept
can be broadened to encompass any ongoing feedback process between two evolving systems,
including social and ecological systems. … Sociosystems and ecosystems are maintained through
numerous feedback mechanisms. Coevolution occurs when at least one feedback is changed, which
then initiates a reciprocal process of change."
  Norgaard and Dixon (1986) have derived some general rules from a co-evolutionary perspective for
designing projects which may be applicable to a policy of eco-innovation:
•   sustain system productivity and diversity,
•   start small and experiment,
•   use monitoring and experiental learning systems,
•   maintain flexibility,
•   reduce vulnerability and
•   avoid big, fixed plans.
 
 4.2 Specialty of eco-innovation III: increasing importance of social and
institutional innovation
  Having in mind the danger of a technology-bias as mentioned in section 0, the co-evolutionary
framework seems to be more appropriate to analyze eco-innovations for at least two reasons:•   It includes all sub-systems, i.e. co-evolving social, ecological and institutional systems avoiding
any ranking of their importance, and
•   it underscores the importance of their interactions.
  The history of pesticide policy and the phasing out of CFCs are textbook examples of co-
evolutionary innovation processes highlighting the importance of interactions between
technological, social and institutional innovations. In the CFC phase-out, the Montreal Protocol has
been a key success factor illustrating the importance of institutional innovations (see for details on
pesticide policy Norgaard, 1994, pp. 23-28; on the CFC phase-out in Germany and the United States
Osorio-Peters and Kuehn, 1998) .
  Freeman’s emphasis on the crucial role of institutional and social re-organization (cited in section 0)
within a paradigm of "green" innovation shows that he is well aware of the need for a broader
approach. However, the co-evolutionary approach has not yet been elaborated for specific purposes
of eco-innovation research.
8 Thus a research-need can be identified for opening up evolutionary
approaches in innovation economics to co-evolving ecological, institutional and technological
systems.
 4.3 Technological change
  Due to the pressures of the selection environment a certain technology may become a dominant
“technological paradigm". Advantages in transaction costs, learning curves, economies of scale,
superior cost-benefit-ratios and a good fit with existing life-styles, technologies, infrastructures or
networks result in path-dependencies or technological trajectories (Dosi, 1988), i.e. to lock-in
effects of a technology excluding other evolutionary options. Examples of technological paradigms
are oil-based chemistry and semi-conductors.
  Kemp (1997, pp. 279 - 289) describes determinants and success factors of technological change as
follows:
•   Determinants are new scientific insights which open up new technological opportunities,
pressing technological needs (e.g., technological bottlenecks to further emission reductions
through incremental improvements of end-of-pipe technologies, high costs of further advances
within a technical design, such as carbon dioxide reductions within fossil energy technologies,
changes in demand, scarcity of materials, or labor conflict) and entrepreneurial activities and
institutional support for radically original technologies.
•   Important success factors of radical technological change are early market niches and the use of
available knowledge and techniques, i.e. a certain compatibility with existing know how,
experience and infrastructure.
  Having identified these success factors, Kemp (1997, p. 310) suggests to foster technological
change by a policy of strategic niche management, i.e., the "creation of protected spaces for
promising technologies that we want to point out." The  idea is to install temporary pilot markets
protected by subsidies or other regulatory measures . Examples are:
•   the success stories of wind energy markets in Denmark and Germany which are especially
interesting for a close cooperation between environmental and eco-innovation policy, i.e.
between economic incentives (subsidies in Germany, energy tax in Denmark) and technology
support programs (Hemmelskamp, 1998),
                                                          
 
8 Although Kemp (1997, p. 3 and p. 276) uses the term co-evolution, he does not explain or elaborate this terminology
and concentrates on technological innovations.•   the "Los Angeles Initiative" requiring that zero-emission cars must account for 2 per cent to 10
per cent of new car production in the 1998 - 2003 period as creating a temporary protected area
for electric vehicles (Templin, 1991, p. 310),
•   the idea of a “Renewables Portfolio Standard” under which every retail power supplier would be
required to purchase renewable energy credits equivalent to some percentage of its total energy
sales (Rader and Norgaard, 1996).
The examples show that a policy fostering technological eco-innovations can not be reduced to
technological support programs nor to conventional environmental policy measures, but has to find
intelligent combinations of both. The problem is of course to find a balance between protection and
selection pressure. However some protection may be necessary even in the diffusion phase due to
the degree of existing external costs not yet internalized by environmental policy. Thus close
coordination between environmental policy and eco-innovation policy will be necessary.
4.4 Perspectives
Evolutionary approaches seem to be very useful for providing additional insight into radical
technological change. Compared to neoclassical economics they follow a somewhat broader
approach as they allow surprises and consider technological path-dependencies. It would be
worthwhile, however, to open up the evolutionary framework to ecological irreversibility and to
strengthen social and institutional innovations. This may be helpful for avoiding "technology bias."
It seems to be beneficial to link neoclassical and evolutionary models in further research. For
example, Kemp (1997) has combined neoclassical and evolutionary approaches of eco-innovation to
a certain extent. He introduced uncertainty, specific technology characteristics and shifting
consumer preferences into neoclassical models and rational choice and optimization into the
discussion of technological regime shifts.
5 Conclusions
Both neoclassical and (co)-evolutionary approaches have their merits and limits concerning a theory
and policy of eco-innovation. Neoclassical methods are most elaborated to analyze the efficiency of
incentive systems which seems to be essential for stimulating innovation. Furthermore, neoclassical
approaches explain two important specialties of eco-innovation: the double externality problem and
the regulatory push/pull effect.
Evolutionary approaches are more appropriate for analyzing long-term, radical technological
changes including path-dependencies, technological irreversibility, transition processes,
discontinuous and unpredictable events. It is suggested here to open up the evolutionary framework
to interactions with ecological systems (e.g., to consider ecological irreversibility as a main driving
force for eco-innovation) and to strengthen the importance of social and institutional innovations.
The co-evolutionary approach has been applied to explain the third specialty of eco-innovation
emphasizing these interactions of ecological, social and institutional systems. This underscores the
need for a consideration of social and institutional innovation in both eco-innovation theory and
policy and may help to avoid a "technology bias".
It can be concluded that the three specialties of eco-innovation require a specific eco-innovation
theory and policy. The double externality problem consolidates elements of environmental and
innovation theory. The regulatory-push/pull hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence fromseries of  case studies and (fewer) industry surveys. And the relative importance of institutional and
social change is mentioned throughout the literature on eco-innovation.
However, the theoretical and empirical work on eco-innovation is still in its beginning.
Nevertheless, it seems that it can already give some theoretical support and empirical evidence to
establish a specific eco-innovation policy. A carefully designed, forward-looking eco-innovation
policy may be able to cut the costs of a policy toward sustainability dramatically. It requires close
coordination with environmental policy in all innovation phases. Environmental and eco-innovation
policy can be regarded as complementarily. However, an environmental policy neglecting the
potentially beneficial effects of a specific eco-innovation policy (especially in the invention phase)
may lead to excessive economic costs.
Thus the need for a specific theory and policy of eco-innovation seems evident. Some may wonder
if it makes sense to redefine every kind of technical, institutional and socioeconomic change or
reform as innovation. However, in our context the only relevant criteria for valuing change is that it
is somehow new and a certain likelihood that it leads in the desired direction. A more restrictive
selection and support of options, e.g., a focus on technologies, is explicitly not intended as long as a
diversity of other options exists which might be supplementary, superior, etc. Thus innovation
policy should open up a narrow technological definition of innovation to all kinds of organizational,
behavioral and institutional change. This may have quite substantial impacts on avoiding a
technology bias and unsustainable development.
Some further elements of eco-innovation theory and policy have not yet been mentioned or
elaborated in this paper. They include management approaches in business administration
(management of eco-innovation as outlined, e.g., by Porter and van der Linde 1995b; Fuzzler 1996)
and approaches from policy analysis (see Blazejczak et al. 1998). However, within a broader co-
evolutionary paradigm, conceptual and methodological pluralism and interdisciplinary research are
welcome. Approaches from business administration, policy analysis and other disciplines enrich the
discussion. Synergies, conflicts and complementarity between the concepts may be an issue for
further research.
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